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The ‘No’ in Denmark’s EU referendum poses a dilemma for all EU
governments, not least the UK
On 3 December, Danish voters rejected a proposal from the government to change its status from
being exempt from EU Justice and Home Affairs to a new position where it could ‘opt-in’ on legislation
on a case-by-case basis. Sara Hagemann notes that the debate surrounding the referendum in
Denmark was largely about ‘trust’ in the political system. Hence the ‘No’. Nevertheless, she stresses
that the rejection is an ultimate dismissal of a Danish wish to participate in EU cooperation in an area
which is set to define the Union in the future. It also comes at a politically sensitive time for the EU.
Because of EU-sceptic pressures at home, other governments have to carefully consider whether to
make Denmark a ‘case in point’, and decide what the consequences of an opt-out really are.
On Thursday 3rd December Denmark voted ‘No’ in a referendum on the question of whether to join its EU partners in
the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). JHA is of huge political importance as it covers issues such as asylum
policies, police cooperation, border controls, data protection, bankruptcy rules, and much much more. It is also one of
the areas with most policies passed by the governments at the EU level every year (see Figure 1 below).
Figure 1: Policies adopted by the EU governments in the Council of the European Union per policy area
(2004-2014)
Denmark has had an opt-out from this area since it first rejected the Maastricht treaty in a public vote in 1992. At the
time, the Danish ‘No’ halted the ratification process for the whole Union, and the Danish government had to negotiate
a set of opt-outs, which in addition to cooperation in justice and home affairs also include exceptions from the Euro
and any EU common defence policies. The opt-outs meant that the government could return to the Danish public with
a modified proposal of the Maastricht treaty in a second vote. That second vote resulted in a ‘Yes’ to the treaty, and
hence allowed for the ratification process to continue.
The rest of the EU could therefore move forward, and Denmark got a solution which took the pressure off the
government domestically, and seemed to work for it in Brussels too: While not having the right to vote in areas within
its opt-out, Denmark has been present in all JHA negotiations throughout the years, and has secured ‘parallel
agreements’ with its EU partners on a number of occasions where it wished to apply important EU acts to Danish
circumstances too.
It has also been able to transpose EU law directly into Danish law where policies were agreed at an intergovernmental
level, allowing the Danish parliament to consider them as a version of international agreements rather than
supranational policy-making by the EU institutions. (There are only three instances where the EU considered parallel
agreements with Denmark not to be in their interest, and hence rejected a Danish request for participating in EU
legislation).
In other words, Denmark’s opt-out has meant a status of ‘restricted member’ in negotiations, rather than an ‘outsider’.
This is bound to change after last week’s vote.
Figure 2: Danish opt-outs and special arrangements in JHA
Snowball effect?
The ‘No’ last week did not draw headlines outside of Denmark to the same extent that it did in ’92, as there is no
treaty or major political decision at stake for the rest of the EU member states this time. Indeed, there are no
immediate changes for the remaining 27 members, and they may – at first – consider the rejection by the Danes
rather ‘harmless’ at a time where the political agenda is busy enough as it is.
However, the consequences of the Danish ‘No’ could turn out to be considerable as EU leaders have to decide what
to do with Denmark – should it be definitively excluded from all Justice and Home Affairs cooperation, including
arrangements such as ‘parallel agreements’?
The main concern other EU governments have when making this decision is that they are themselves increasingly
under pressure from EU sceptic parties and lobby groups at home. If the Danes have been able to sit in on JHA
negotiations so far, and subsequently pick and choose between policies they did want to participate in, then why
shouldn’t other countries be able to do the same? Allowing Denmark to continue in Europol, for instance, after an
ultimate rejection of EU cooperation in such a defining area of EU affairs would send a signal that you can vote ‘No’,
but still be able to get what you want.
That sort of fragmentation is detrimental not only to EU cooperation at a time where governments generally seek
ways to cooperate more not less in order to address the many challenges in Europe today, such as those related to
the refugee crisis, Eurozone governance, economic growth, and terrorism. But it is also a real challenge for
governments’ own survival in a domestic political environment which has not been so polarised since WWII (the
French regional elections offering a case in point).
Governments are hence aware that Denmark could set a precedent for any other countries that may seek to secure
opt-outs or parallel deals in the future – whether within existing areas or under new initiatives (enhanced Eurozone or
Schengen). And then there’s of course the dominant question of what deal the UK would get if it was to leave the
Union. David Cameron will find the Danish dilemma particularly hard as it is in the UK’s interest to keep a door open
on this question – but any ambiguity regarding the consequences of a ‘No’ would bolster the arguments of the leave
campaign in the UK, and hence threaten the position of his own government.
EU leaders may therefore find it necessary to make Denmark a test case and show that there are real consequences
of opting out of EU politics, whether partly or entirely.
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